證詞 (哲學)

在哲學中，證詞或證言（英語：testimony）是一個實體（個人或團體等）向另一個實體傳達的命題，無論是透過言語、文字還是面部表情，都是基於實體的知識庫。^[1] 如果條件滿足評估表達者的可靠性（其證詞是否經常是真實的）和接收者擁有積極的理由（例如，表達者沒有偏見）等條件，則基於證詞相信的命題是合理的。^[2]

我們也可以理性地接受基於他人證詞的主張，除非發現以下至少一項是真實的：

該主張是不可信的
引述主張的人或來源缺乏可信度
該主張超出了該人根據其自身經驗和能力所能了解的範圍^[3]

參考資料

^ Audi, Robert, The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, Rational Belief, Oxford University Press: 217–236, 2015-09-01, ISBN 978-0-19-022184-3, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012
^ Lackey, Jennifer. Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1999, 49 (197): 471–490. ISSN 0031-8094. JSTOR 2660497. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154.
^ Trudy Govier. A practical study of Argument 6th. 2005 [1985]. ISBN 9780534605254. For the notion of testimony in general, and especially after David Hume, see the seminal research by C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 1992.

[1] Audi, Robert, The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, Rational Belief, Oxford University Press: 217–236, 2015-09-01, ISBN 978-0-19-022184-3, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012

[2] Lackey, Jennifer. Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1999, 49 (197): 471–490. ISSN 0031-8094. JSTOR 2660497. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154.

[3] Trudy Govier. A practical study of Argument 6th. 2005 [1985]. ISBN 9780534605254. For the notion of testimony in general, and especially after David Hume, see the seminal research by C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 1992.

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